Session 1

Categorizing & Labelling Violence (Q-704)

Julia Emtseva

Max Planck Institute Germany

The Politics of Border Clashes: How Language Shapes Conflict

The Case of the Tajik-Kyrgyz Conflict

The whole world is shaken by the tragic events happening along Ukrainian frontlines. Other conflicts, however, including those which might be profoundly important for regional, and perhaps even global security remain overlooked. One such conflict is the recent escalation of violence on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border. The narrative used by those few international actors that talk about the conflict is built around the term "border clashes". While the use of this term might well be a policy-driven decision in order to avoid the escalation of the situation, there is a lack of

K. Bailey Thomas

Dartmouth College

Reconsidering and Reconciling Violence: A Musing from the Black Radical Tradition

The summer of 2020 in the United States was, to say the least, tumultuous. The reckoning that the country faced in the wake of George Floyd's and Breonna Taylor's murders has yet to lull, with many Black Americans demanding the federal government to put an end to the daily terror that exists in their lives. Black Lives Matter, which had originated in 2012 after the murder of Trayvon Martin, had been propelled to the forefront of conservative media as a "radical Black identity group" that sought to terrorize or worse, kill, white Americans. The very statement that Black lives mattered caused immense uproar from its first utterance and many whites considered it an act of violence against their very being. While many recall 2020 as the year that the world stopped due to the outbreak of the coronavirus, for Black Americans there are additional memories of protests, riots, and demonstrations. Political pundits questioned whether these political acts were ethically and/or socially just, and heavily focused on the behaviors and actions of the civilians to legitimize or delegitimize the grievances being presented.

I argue that by only focusing on the actions of protestors, we overlook how responses by civilians and state agents are not only violent but ought to categorize the event as violent itself. Failing to do so creates an ethical dilemma wherein marginalized communities must circumvent the egos of hegemonic groups to petition for justice. Condemnations of violence are often leveed at marginalized groups to distract from the ways in which state agents and governments have failed to properly serve these groups, which is done by critiquing the response of marginalized communities to their oppression and subjugation as opposed to addressing the routes of these injustices. In this talk I will discuss the ways in which events are deemed "violent" from the

Alice Craven

The American University of Paris

Racial Violence in America and its Turning Perceptive(s)

An act of violence becomes named by those who use it. The violence of Nat Turner was long seen as racial violence committed by an unruly slave. He was considered unjustly as a man bent on redressing the actions of slave owners. But acts of violence such as his become very different when perspectives on them evolve. Perspectives on Nat Turner change and he is seen as heroic in the novel of William Styron or in the 2016 film of Nate Parker. In like manner there are turning perspectives in the case of the 1922 Tulsa massacre. The event is also referred to as the burning of black Wall Street. The changing perspectives shown by the directors of the 2022 film recounting the event. Both of these violent uprisings are acts of mass violence. But even the death of Emmett Till an act of individual is varied from perspectives. These three acts are to be analysed in this paper. With Till there are many artistic perspectives are created but the violence put upon this young boy while done by individual triggers a massive for the Civil Rights movement. Violence is named by those who use it. But these are also named by those who see the acts of violence from other perspectives. This paper presents that renaming of violence in the examples given in this proposal.

Laura T. Murphy

Sheffield Hallam University, Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice

Manufacturing Vulnerability: State Violence and the Response to Uyghur Dissent in China

In 2009, Uyghur people took to the streets of Ürümchi (the capitol of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China, often called East Turkestan by its indigenous population) to protest the murder of several Uyghur men by Han co-workers in Guangdong. The protests turned violent and as many as 200 people were killed in street fights between Han and Uyghur people. A series of terrorist and smaller attacks against state actors followed. Like much anticolonial violence, Uyghurs who turned to violence were protesting generations of political exclusion, as well as state and ethnically-targeted violence against their community.

The state's response to isolated Uyghur violence was swift and increasingly harsh, building within five years to a "strike hard campaign," through which regional and local governments developed a system of internment and forced labor that would affect practically all minoritized citizens of the region. Of a population of approximately 12 million, over a million people were put in extra-judicial internment camps, 3 million were conscripted by the state to work in factories, and 50% of children were moved into boarding schools.

This paper will argue that the state justified its response to Uyghur anti-state violence through two intertwined discourses that simultaneously legitimized state violence and delegitimized indigenous resistance. The first was grounded in post-9/11 anti-terrorism discourse, through which the state projected the acts of a few onto an entire ethnic group and its Islamic practice. Reducing legitimate political concerns and demands to terrorist activity relegated the group to the realm of illogic and served as justification for the development of hundreds of re-education camps. The second legitimizing discourse was the adoption of development studies rhetoric, whereby the state deployed "poverty alleviation" as a discursive strategy through which it reduced justifiable political discontent to a perceived inherent lack of interest in economic improvement. The government created a system of state-sponsored forced labor that defined the vast majority of people as "surplus labor" and assigned them to factories, and in the process, stripped people of their traditional and/or trained vocations, lands, culture, and often families.

Both strategies did result in the reduction of public dissent in East Turkestan. However, I argue that the state has in fact manufactured vulnerability that it has used to further justify its rhetoric of paternalistic care, but which at the same time is likely to increase political discontent and international support for the Uyghur cause.

Radicalization & Violence (Q-801)

Eric Marlière

Universite de Lille

Working-Class Neighborhoods in Conflict with Institutions

In our different fields, I have been able to observe tensions and conflicts of all kinds between the supervisory institutions, politicians in general and young adults in working-class urban neighborhoods. Although the social paths of young people from "neighborhoods" are more heterogeneous than we are usually shown, particularly between students, galley slaves, sportsmen, petty criminals, employees or the few stuck in organized crime, there are social but also ethno-racial determinisms that seal most fates. These forms of inequality in democracy lead to antagonisms between its young people and the different forms of power that surround them. Thus, gradually a kind of distrust was established against the institutions of the Republic on the part of certain young people encountered in the halls which is linked to a social, post-colonial history and a collective and personal experience made of injustice, inequality, discrimination, humiliation, etc. Mistrust that leads to anger somehow reinforced by a social frustration that has its roots in what his teenagers and young adults apprehend as the republican lie with the triptych "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity". These recurring tensions observed for more than forty years now are manifested by "incivility", provocations, insults, urban riots or even forms of political radicalization. We are therefore entitled to ask ourselves if these different manifestations of violence and aggressiveness conveyed by certain young adults are they not in some way the expression of political forms from below or infra-politics? This question now seems central to us insofar as the political demands of the majority of the inhabitants of working-class neighborhoods have never been taken into account by the institutions, constantly leading to rage, anger, democratic manipulation because they are totally denied by the channels republican institutions and a public space held by the upper middle classes at the local level and the big bourgeoisie at the national level and above. This observation is not without consequences after 40 years now in the perception of its different generations of young people where feelings of injustice, distrust, suspicion and disbelief guide the political issues. In order to better understand the situations experienced on a daily basis, we will first come back to the difficult relationships maintained between young people and the supervisory institutions. Then we will try to reflect on the political issues that led to this situation of confrontation. Finally, in a last step, we will try to propose a reflection on the problem of politicization from below of these forms of violence.

Umut Korkut

D.Rad and Glasgow Caledonian University

conflict between Russia and Europe over the war in Ukraine has become a further element of radicalisation.

Reflecting on trends, stakeholders as well as policy and legal aspects of radicalisation in these states, in this book chapter I will assess European integration as an instrument of radicalisation in the EU's periphery.

Bartolomeo Conti

CEMS/EHESS

Trajectories of (Non)Radicalisation in a French Prison

Why and how do some young people become radicalised, while others who share similar social conditions and sense of injustice do not? Why and how do some trajectories lead to violent extremism, while others do not cross the threshold into violence? Based on two years of ethnographic research and experimental actions carried out in a French prison, this presentation tries to answer these questions by focusing not exclusively on so-called 'radicalised' young people but taking into consideration a wider variety of inmate profiles and trajectories, in order to describe and analyse trajectories that could be described as "nonradicalisation". The first part of the presentation briefly illustrates the theoretical framework for approaching radicalisation and non-radicalisation as a continuum along which individuals shift and whose journeys may be started, paused or reversed at multiple points along it.

The second part first illustrates that detachment - the breaking of emotional, social and political ties - is at the heart of radicalisation since it constitutes a process by which individuals become detached from precarious ties which connect them to social or territorial spaces.

Faced with a binary narrative, centred on desocialisation and opposing 'true Islam' to infidels, Us to Them, alternative narratives are developed by those who do not adhere to, or even resist, the discourse of radical Islam. To respond to a common feeling of injustice, they mobilise resources and social and cultural capital to maintain, rediscover or strengthen preexisting emotional, social and political ties. The presentation therefore concludes with an illustration of the multiple 'safeguards' that shield one from the temptation of totally breaking with society.

Valentina Nava

Université Paris Cité

l Extrêmedroite dans la Lombardie Nord-Orientale

Les mouvements d'extrême-droite connaissent un taux d'adhésion croissant à travers le monde et en Europe. Les dernières élections en Italie ont montré un soutien accru pour cette aile politique, avec la victoire de l'alliance d'extrême-droite (Fratelli d'Italia et Lega). Les discours

Affective Subjectivation and Control of Urban Space: Right-

Nina Janz

University of Luxembourg

The ego documents, especially war letters from the front of the soldiers, have been studied from many points of view. The letters contain much information about the use of 'violence', whether in terms of the striking power of the weapons and the encounters and dealings with locals, prisoners of war or the 'enemy'.

As the main task of the soldiers was to use violence to win or avoid being killed, the understanding and use of violence (towards enemy soldiers and locals) is a constant factor in the letters. As authors such as Latzel (Latzel 2004) and Buchbender (Buchbender and Sterz 1983) have studied the expression and use of war letters by soldiers, I, too, have come across many references and hints of the concept of violence in the sources in my current project.

In the WARLUX project, we have collected the ego-documents of Wehrmacht soldiers' (letters, diaries and photographs). In my contribution to this conference, I will discuss the use and reference of 'violence' in soldiers' letters during the Second World War in the context of an in-depth study of the reading and analysis of the letters. Even if the sources are biased from the interpretative side, these doubts are nevertheless urgent to consider when studying violence and the effects of violence in wars.

After a historiographical overview, I will present my current project and the extensive results of the war letters and diaries of Wehrmacht soldiers. With the help of digital tools (e.g. topic modelling and text analysis), I will present the results of the representation and justification

Andreas Moeller

King's College London

From Us to Them: Drivers of Perpetration of Mass Atrocities by Bosnian Government Forces during the Bosnian War

Mass atrocities against civilians remain a prominent feature of both interstate and intrastate warfare, as Russia's invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated. Ti　　at　　d.st　ei

Tara Keenan-Thomson

John Cabot University Rome

Resistance Discourses in the Early Northern Irish Troubles: A Look at How Gender and Family Informed Political Activism and Violence

In the early 1970s the decision among many Catholics to engage the Northern Irish state generally took one of two forms – one could either join a social justice movement and engage in street politics, or one could join a paramilitary movement and engage in political violence. This paper looks at how the intersection of gender and family ties informed Catholic activists'

Colonialism and Forced Labor in North America (Q-704)

Nora Slonimsky

Iona University

In the tension between symbolic and material violence, intellectual property occupies a contested space. A recognition of ownership over the products of one's mind, copyright and patents are effectively individual and collective rights to artistic and scientific expressions, broadly understood. Both historic and present-day copyrights and patents hinge on stability, stability that comes from state-recognized and supported practices. And yet the history of intellectual property in North America is littered with explicit violence, from the entrenchment of the brutality of slavery buttressed by patented technology like Eli Whitney's cotton gin to the patenting of the handheld pistol by Samuel Colt, redefining the accessibility of gun ownership. Patents ensured their success, and in doing so, transformed the violence they generated from abstract to physical. And yet intellectual property was also deployed as a counter to violence,

Alec Zuercher Reichardt

University of Missouri

violence: the ways that the state and corporate interests have long framed Indigenous violence in these confrontations, highlighting the "disruptive" and "disordered" violence of supposed non-state actors, a portrayal that has simultaneously obscured Euro-American state violence and denied Indigenous violence as an expression of native sovereignty.

Hayley Negrin

University of Illinois at Chicago

Violent Harvests: Indigenous Children and Slavery in Early Virginia

An estimated 50,000 Southeastern Native Americans were enslaved from 1670-1717 in

Ivón Padilla-Rodríguez

Session 3

Sources of Violence. Theoretical and Political Perspectives (Q-801)

Rafi Reznik

Polonsky Academy, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute

Willa Rae Culpepper-Witherow

Rutgers University

Men of Steel and Little Iron Cogs: Locating Motives of Perpetrators in the Use of Language and Construction by Prosecutors and Defense in Tribunals

Some derided the military tribunals at Nuremberg as performative "victor's justice." Certain Allied leaders dismissed it as a form of pageantry that could have easily been taken care of with mass executions of Nazi perpetrators. Yet a crucial aspect of the IMT and NMT was not just punishment, but the arriving at it; the naming of a crime and asking holders of positions of power and bureaucracy to answer for it. Professional forecasters of mass atrocities and practitioners of genocide prevention have mapped structural causes from frustrated regimes to security crises, yet the question of individual perpetration still often remains one best answered by the perpetrators themselves. The lens of the Nuremberg Tribunals, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have allowed us to see what rationales for violence are presented when under duress of prosecution. While this clearly skews the opportunity for honest voicing of motives, it also presents unique insights through the tension of prosecutorial and defense strategies.

The Nazis famously once thought of their elites as men of steel, supermen- but at Nuremberg reduced themselves to "little iron cogs" just following orders. Scholars later distilled this into the "willing executioner" versus "ordinary man" debate. While the truth is likely somewhere in the middle, the development of perpetrator studies and qualitative interviews with genocidaires, the evolution of specialized international law tasked with assigning responsibility for crimes against humanity, and contemporaneous statements by defendants to the press or through memoirs gives us insight into drivers of violence both large and small. How do these individuals locate themselves within networks and regimes, but also how do they frame interpersonal violence against neighbors and by their own hands within a legally accountable setting? Do they envision their motives as driven by larger economic, religious, or political forces? Is personal psychology relevant, or useful to legal practitioners? Is violence treated by the courts and individuals as symbolic, or material- and how do these relate to the overarching desired outcome of a reputable record of events and mechanism of justice towards long-lasting peace? And how much do these legal approaches and language alter and adapt given the different cultural contexts and temporal gaps between conflict and courtrooms across the legacies of the Holocaust, Balkans conflicts and Khmer Rouge in Cambodia?

Brian Schiff

The American University of Paris

Violent Horizons: Understanding Perpetrators of Collective Violence

In this paper, I discuss the various stances that researchers can take toward the study of perpetrators of collective violence. I argue for the importance and utility of stances that attempt to restore words and meanings (Ricoeur, 1970) in order to understand the horizons (Gadamer, 1960/2004) of perpetrators. Using Payton Gendron, who murdered ten African Americans in a Buffalo New York supermarket in May 2022, as a focus of reflection, I argue that restoring the horizons of perpetrators helps us to better understand the various meanings, specifically the language of moral values, that motivate and scaffold violent actions.

Sylvain Baizoumi Wambae

École Normale Supérieure, Université de Maroua

Les Délits de Menaces Sous Conditions et les Violences Dégénératives Perpétrées par les

Sociétés Pastorales Arabe-choa, Foulbé et Mbororo au Nordcameroun

En 2017, 128 personnes ont été prises en otage dans l'arrondissement de Bélel. Parmi elles 67 ont été libérées après payement d'une rançon, 3 ont été réduit en esclavage, 2 ont été paralysés, 1 a été amputé du bras droit, 01 s'est vu coupé les deux oreilles tandis que 55 autres ont été froidement assassinés par leurs ravisseurs. Parallèlement à cette zone en proie aux exactions des bandes armées venues du Tchad et de la République Centrafricaine, plusieurs dizaines de pasteurs Arabe-Choa ont été égorgés dans les départements du Logone et Chari et du Mayo Sava par les groupes terroristes affiliés à Boko Haram pour la seule période 2017-2019. Derrière tous ces chiffres effroyables des violences exercées à l'encontre des populations se cachent en réalité plusieurs communautés en situation de vulnérabilité environnementale et sociale au Nord-Cameroun. Il s'agit notamment des sociétés pastorales ArabeChoa, Foulbé et Mbororo disséminées dans presque toutes les prairies herbeuses dans cette région. Ainsi, quels sont les mobiles qui poussent les autres communautés à s'en prendre violemment à ces pasteurs ? Quels sont les facteurs inhérents à ces sociétés pastorales qui expliquent la genèse, le regain de vitalité et la pérennisation des actes de violence perpétrées à leur encontre ? Quelle typologie dresser de ces maltraitances et quelles sont les politiques publiques développées par l'État du Cameroun et la communauté internationale pour les contrer ? La présente communication s'intéresse à la prévalence des délits de menaces sous conditions et des violences dégénératives

Session 4

Non-Violent Responses (Q-704)

Özge Derman

Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales

Gestures of (In)Vulnerability

The present paper focuses on the gestural repertories of action in the presence of symbolic or actual violence in different circumstances of social and political unrest. The question is to understand how vulnerability of singular bodies before violence is transformed into acts of resistance through a variety of gestures, such as the "hands-up" and the "kneel-in" related to the Black Lives Matter in the United States (Schneider 2017), the "stand-in" of the Standing Man (Derman 2017) and the "whirling dervish" within the Gezi Uprising in Istanbul, the "hand signals" actively engaged in the assemblies of Occupy Wall Street, the historic sit-ins to oppose segregation during the Civil Rights Movement, the die-ins of the group ACTUP to draw attention to the AIDS crisis, and the notorious bed-in by Yoko Ono and John Lennon to protest the Vietnam War. In this regard, gesture as the "relational event" (Escobar 2022) draws on diverse situations contending with violence and engenders potential non-violent responses through quotidian practices. Moreover, enacting a social and/or political vulnerability, exclusion, and inequality (Butler 2015; Butler et al. 2016) through bodily gestures reveals the power of spontaneous or tactical acts in the face of various levels and forms of violence.

menace terroriste. Malgré son importance, la question des processus de réintégration sociale des personnes condamnées pour terrorisme reste, en France, très peu étudiée et évoquée par les médias (Da Silva, Amadio, et al., 2022). Les recherches françaises sont marquées par la prédominance des « radicalization studies qui, pour une large part, sont d'abord une sociologie des trajectoires, des facteurs et des processus de « radicalisation » » (Chantraîne, Sheer & Beunas, 2022 : 274).

Cela fait pourtant plusieurs années que chercheurs et praticiens internationaux cherchent à en comprendre plus avant les dynamiques (Altier, 2021, Raets, 2022). Ces recherches montrent que comprendre les enjeux de la réintégration sociale en matière d'extrémisme violent nécessite de mobiliser des approches pluridisciplinaires capables d'intégrer les problématiques sociales, sécuritaires et judiciaires, mais aussi d'interroger des dimensions transversales, à l'instar de la violence.

L'objectif de cette communication est de montrer que, si la violence constitue une dimension essentielle de la socialisation à l'extrémisme, elle est également un point nodal de la réintégration sociale. Nous nous appuierons sur la littérature internationale en matière de désengagement de l'extrémisme violent et de réintégration sociale, ainsi que sur les données empiriques (observations, entretiens avec personnes condamnées pour terrorisme et acteurs professionnels) issues de la recherche ANR TROC (ANR-20-CE39-0007). Dans une première partie, nous définirons les termes de réintégration sociale en matière d'extrémisme violent et caractériserons notre usage du terme de violence. Dans une deuxième partie, notre propos se focalisera sur l'importance de la prise en compte de la violence en termes d'objectif (démobilisation/désengagement/déradicalisation, Altier, 2021), de processus identitaire

Maliheh Mousanejad

Azam Niazy Komleh

University of Kharazmi

Non-Violence of Iranian Women

About three months have passed since the "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement and popular uprising in Iran. During the past months, with the increase in the scope of the popular uprising, the efforts of the Iranian government to resort to force and violence against the Iranian people have also increased. A look at the pattern of violence against women in the struggles of recent months shows that the government's violence against women is much more severe than in the past. They used every means to fight against women, but this did not reduce the amount of women's protests in this movement. The reason for that is the difference between the "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement and the past movements and the increase in the agency of women and the effort to change and achieve a specific political goal, i.e. regime change. This reason, along with other reasons, fueled the government's violence against women and entered another stage of the Iranian government's practice of physically eliminating women. It is certain that none of these violent repressions have diminished women's presence in the Women's Lives and Freedoms movement, but have empowered them to create new ways to maintain and overcome their power in the political arena. The violent actions of the current government The important question of this article is that despite the adoption of violent methods by the repressive government for the people of Iran, how is it that women still use peaceful methods to protest? And despite the fact that many women were killed or arrested by the government in the current movement, what factors have made Iranian women avoid violence against the government? In other words, what are the reasons for Iranian women's non-violence in the "Women, Life, Freedom" movement? And their protest ways and methods have appeared in what forms? In the current research, we address these questions by using historical documents and discourse analysis of Iranian women's slogans in the recent Iranian movement.

Angela Mullis

Rutgers University

Revealing the Unseen: Violence, Whiteness, and Citizenship in the

Works of Claudia Rankine

Claudia Rankine has emerged over the past decade as a leading voice in American literature, and her important work on the racial imaginary and whiteness presents alternative

Session 5

Naming and Recognizing Violence (Q-801)

Revital Madar

Max Weber EUI

Looting and Rape as Boundary-Making Crimes in Sovereign Violence

Scholars have argued that sexual violence during war is often considered worse than sex crimes committed during peacetime (Benson & Gizelis, 2020), and that revelations about sex crimes attract greater international attention to conflicts (Kolmasova & Krulisova, 2019). Such sensationalisation of sex crimes overshadows other forms of violence committed during wars, asensationalisation

Rupali Bansode

University of Pennsylvania

Evidencing Caste Violence Caste

Violence committed against dalits is a recognized phenomenon in South Asia -- some numbers show the rampant existence of this violence. Yet, why do cases of such rampantly committed violence lose their battle in the court? While caste violence often gets reported in the media, it does not receive much scholarly attention. Existing scholarship talks about the limits of the Indian state and courts as casteist institutions and the impunity enjoyed by the upper-caste perpetrators. But this paper argues that along with building a critique of the states and their institutions for their failuop300000>Tm0 g0 G(num)7(be)7(rs)-6(s)-6(how)-6(t)7(he)7(ra)240 612 792 reW*nB'

Ashley Howard

University of Iowa

Many people first encounter Will Brown not from stories of his life but rather the photograph of his gruesome death. In what has become a stock image, steam rises from Brown's exposed and charred body, while dozens of spectators encircle him, gazing approvingly. Though ghastly, this infamous snapshot is an isolated moment in time, incapable of illustrating the man, his story, and the complicated legacy of his death. More Than A Snapshot disrupts prevailing discourses of the 1919 murder as a city's "darkest day." In so doing, the meaning of Will Brown shifts from memento mori to a portrait of Black agency linking nationalism, mythmaking, and the violence of history.

In the wake of global protests originating in Midwestern cities like Ferguson and Minneapolis, there is renewed interest in documenting the regional Black experience. Moreover, as the literal and figurative center, the heartland deserves special consideration of the mechanisms which uphold social hierarchies. Regardless of era or nation, popular imaginings of a "pure" heartland underwrite core populist beliefs, asserting who is and who is not a part of the polity. In the U. S., violence created, maintained, and preserved the idealized Midwestern heartland. Encompassing Native American genocide and displacement, Black laws, sundown towns and other racially restrictive practices, white Midwesterners employed violence in service of racial exclusivity. Yet within the region, white citizens cultivated a self-congratulatory, progressive identity, denying their own sordid past. Through the sin of omission, historians perpetuate myths that the Midwest is immune to racial strife, forgoing a complicated account for a comfortable one.

In naming this historical "misremembering," I demonstrate that violence occurs not only at 004460057700487000300577004B➢200044700577000030059004C70052➢207(t)7(he)7(M)-6(i00030059004C

Gender and Violence (Q-704)

Emilia Lounela

University of Helsinki

Kirsti Sippel

University of Turku

Unfit for Love? Evolutionary Justifications for Involuntary Celibacy, Misogyny and

Incel ("involuntary celibacy") online communities have received increased academic and public interest in recent years, especially following acts of mass violence connected to incels. These online communities share a strong sense of masculine victimhood (e.g. Blommaert 2018) and misogyny (e.g. Ging 2019). They attract mostly young men who have constructed an identity around their perceived lack of romantic and sexual attention from women. One of the most frequent explanations for sexual exclusion in incel discussions is "lookism", being discriminated against because of their appearance.

Incels have built a pseudo-scientific rationale for their misogyny and male supremacy. Along with the growing intellectual and cultural authority of evolutionary psychology in explaining and justifying gender differences and inequalities (O'Neill 2016), incels are also especially fond of interpretations of Darwinism. Incels present themselves as logical, nonideological and rational (Ging 2019), differentiating themselves from "emotional" and

Shima Esmailian

Transitional Justice for Iran

Female Body, Political Violence and Bodily Resistance in Post-Revolutionary Iran; How the Quiet Revolt of Bodies Turned Into Revolutionary Bodies

The foundation of the Islamic Republic following the 1979 Revolution in Iran materialized partly in reaction to decades of Western imperialism and its cultural hegemony (Westoxification/Gharbzadegi), in which the 'modern woman' as a symbol of 'West' was represented as unveiled, publicly visible and sexually free. The regulation of the female body became instrumental to the politics of the Islamic Republic at home and abroad. Hijab, in particular, was seen by the post-revolution Islamic discourse as a counter-strategy against the West's operation to undermine Islamic identity. The female body has become the battlefield of the new political structure in post-revolutionary Iran, rendering the female body a site of the state's physical and disciplinary violence. In response, women(and later men) have continuously resisted the regime's gender-biased body politics. The bodily resistance of women started with marching against the mandatory hijab a few days after the Islamic revolution. It continued with everyday body protests through gradually changing hijab standards, inventive ways of removing hijab, and dancing and singing in public, and reached its highest point by burning veils and cutting hair during the protests that started in September 2022; a movement some consider a feminist uprising against the regime.

This paper explores why hijab has become a symbol of collective struggle, not only for women but for a wider group of those who demand 'equality, life, and freedom'. This paper examines the brief history of body politics and bodily resistance in postrevolutionary Iran in five political stages; from the post-Islamic revolution period to the feminist uprising against the regime. By demonstrating that the form, severity and prevalence of this violence, as well as the woman's response, had been shaped by a broader political context, it clarifies the organic relationship between this naked form of body oppression against women with other systematic forms of political violence against general society. It specifically looks at the past decade when men gradually became a part of the fight against mandatory hijab, and argues that the transformation of the quiet revolt of bodies into revolutionary bodies occurred only when the hijab transcended from a feminism-focused justice issue to a social justice issue. This qualitative research builds on politics and violence studies, in particular Johanna Oksala's Foucauldian analysis of body politics, violence and anarchic body, as well as human rights reports, legal documents, media reports and social media analysis in English and Farsi sources(doctrinal methodology).

Session 6

Mediating Violence (Q-704)

James Kimble

Seton Hall University

Washington Burning: The Role of Militarization and Enmification in the Violence of the 1932 Bonus Expediatory Force

One of the US military's most disgraceful battles took place along the shores of the Anacostia River less than two miles from the Capitol Building. There, on July 28, 1932, cavalry and infantry units led by General Douglas MacArthur, Major George S. Patton, and Major Dwight D. Eisenhower violently evicted the so-called Bonus Marchers. This motley group consisted of some 6,000 World War I-era veterans and their family members who had all pledged to occupy the swampy land along the river until the government agreed to redeem the veterans' military service certificates several years ahead of schedule. Three people in the encampment would die in the violence, and media photographs of the rolling tear gas and burning shacks quickly became an acute embarrassment to the Hoover administration. As the local Daily News editorialized, "if the Army must be called out to make war on unarmed citizens, this is no longer America."

This project addresses the dearth of scholarship on the Bonus Expeditionary Force (BEF), emphasizing the largely forgotten roots of its violent ending. A thorough study of surviving copies of the camp's newspaper, the BEF News, demonstrates that the bonus marchers had for weeks been subject to an increasingly shrill rhetoric of outrage. In both verbal and visual appeals, the newspaper had fostered a polarized context in which the marchers and their families could see themselves as heroic combatants and the government and its agents as brutal, unfeeling enemies. As the occupation swelled, and tensions rose, the emboldened marchers became increasingly confrontational—an attitude that was soon matched by tensions within the government and police.

The appeals of BEF News to both militarization and enmification in the leadup to the Bonus March conflagration offer a rich case study of the gray areas that lie between and among justified public protest, militant political violence, and forceful state responses. In particular, the case study points to the importance of both verbal and visual discourse in fomenting an atmosphere of mistrust in which the potential for violent domestic conflict needs only a spark to ignite. By recovering this lost rhetoric, my project aims to provide insights into at least one way that violence can become manifest.

Michiel Rys

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Questioning the Limits of Police Violence: The Aesthetics of Extremism in the *Tatort* Movie *Verbrannt*

The common view that the police is one of the institutions who is authorized to use violence on state territory in defense of the general interest, is one that has been supported and shaped by popular culture, e.g. by police series. This genre, which deserves scholarly attention because of its wide reach and therefore potential impact, has often been criticized for its conservative ideology: viewers follow the protagonist of a story line that is all about finding the culprit(s) who unrightfully applied violence, and restoring lawfulness. This also applies to the longest-running police show in the German-speaking world, Tatort, a co-production of German, Austrian and Swiss channels, starring different teams and inspectors stationed in more 1 462.cm*nBTdhowtiuggng lafferebiah(a)7(m)7(s

Challenging Violence (Q-801)

Clement Ferrier

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Opposing and Repressing the Violence of the Far Right in Democracy: A Study of Parties, Governmental and Individual Responses to the Violent Turn of the Rexist Movement in Belgium (1936-1940)

This communication proposes to explore the question of the symbolic and physical violence of the extreme right, and the responses made in democracy to repress it, especially in the case of 1930s Belgium.

The Rexist movement, led by Leon Degrelle, is a Belgian far-right movement created in the second half of the 1930s, in the French-speaking part of the country. It developed a violent political discourse initially against the political world, and those it called 'rotten'. As the march towards radicalization of the discourse and its themes began, Rex developed an increasingly violent rhetoric, with new themes such as anti-semitism or xenophobia. This radicalization in discourse and action led to multiple and diverse forms of violence: public insults, defamations, demonstrations, symbolic and political threats to the social order and the Belgian Government. Rexist violence was expressed both in the press and in the public space during political and electoral demonstrations. In May 1936, 33 Rexist representatives swept in at the Palace of the Nation transposed symbolic and physical violence directly inside the highest political authorities.

The emergence and spread of Rexist violence clashed with Belgian political parties, which united in the 'Common Front against Rex', but also with strong governmental responses. The banning of demonstrations, the opposition to the violent speech in the Chamber and the Senate, but also the various court cases against Rex are examples of extensive responses to Rex's political violence. Indeed, using all the legal means (ban on demonstrations, strict application of the general rules of the House, adversarial debates, trials, etc.) at their disposal, members of the executive and political parties attacked the 'Rex phenomenon', regularly and forcefully opposing its various forms of violence (physical, but also symbolic with attacks in the press and in political bodies). However, the emergence of individual responses to Rexist violence, with the implementation of actions bordering on illegality, created a new form of violence in democracy against Leon Degrelle's movement and the Belgian far right.

This fluctuating opposition is studied mainly through the Belgian press, but also through reports in the kingdom's political assemblies, highlighting the different responses and approaches available to individuals, the government and the Belgian political class as a whole.

Eran Itskovich

Badi Hasisi

Mona Khoury-Kassabri

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

**A Wall of Treatments: An Integrative Problem-Solving Approach to the Prevention of
Stone Throwing in East Jerusalem**

There is growing evidence that some proactive policing strategies are effective in crime
reduction. Most of these strategies usually address regular crimes. This raises tt-6(a)7(y2(proa)6(c)-13(t)7(i)

Sharon Weill

The American University of Paris

Sandrine LeFranc

CNRS

Hybridization of Criminal and Transformative Justice: The Bogota and Paris Trials as Judicial Experiments

In Bogota and Paris, two very creative criminal justice experiments/performances have been carried out in the context of a moment of transition, giving an unprecedented place to victims, defendants and experts within the criminal trial.

In France, in the era of jihadist trials, we can observe that a new role for criminal courts is emerging. They become a "forum" giving voice to different actors in order to reconstruct a socio-historical phenomenon in all its complexity, as in truth commissions. These trials, and in particular the so-called "historical" trials, such as the Bataclan trial, become a space where the defendants present their path to radicalization, the victims relate their trauma and expectations, the experts situate the phenomenon in a political, social and medical context, and the police and security services expose their work but also their difficulties. The rich narratives revealed by the different stakeholders, and most notably by hundreds of victims, are at the center of this organic process,

Session 7

Joanna Cruickshank

Deakin University

Crystal McKinnon

University of Melbourne

Colonial Violence and the Limits of History

In this paper, which is written in the context of ongoing colonial violence against Indigenous lands and peoples in the place now commonly known as Australia, we evaluate the capacity of the discipline of history to address this violence in both its past and present forms.In the past few decades, non-Indigenous historians have increasingly drawn upon frameworks developed within postcolonial and settler colonial studies to reinterpret the colonial archive. Using methods such as 'reading against the grain', some historians have sought to make visible the violence that the official discourses of colonialism have often obscured, even as this violence has been continuously experienced and named by Indigenous people. We argue that such scholarly investigations have shown themselves inadequate to the task of disrupting colonial violence, because the epistemic framework and methods of the discipline are likewise a part of ongoing colonialism - a system that is premised upon the removal of Indigenous people from their lands and territories to assert their ownership and sovereignty. The system is adaptable and shifts, and thus academic re-analysis that historians and others conduct to challenge this system will only ever have limited effect. Without challenges to Western imperial knowledge systems and terms themselves, the relationship between these systems and ongoing colonialism remains.

Saadia Sumbal

Forman Christian College University Lahore

Radicalization of Politics of Exclusion in Pakistan

Identity construction was the dominant discourse among Indian Muslims in the twentieth century British India. Political and religious ideologues emphasized the concepts of ideal nation and national community. Religion acted as a political rhetoric to mobilize Muslim community, fusing the community identity into the nationalist ideology of anti-imperialism. Relationship between Islam, state and identity remained paramount in public space in the post-colonial state of Pakistan in 1947. There was a visible resurgence of Islam and the process of identity formation, concurrent to this resurgence was a growing range of activities of religious ideologues and their reach in the public and religious spheres. What created a space for them in politics was Objectives Resolution 1949, a decisive step towards Islamic state which helped to clearly delineate the boundary between Muslim and non-Muslim. The state-led ideological predicament on Islam, helped the key religio-political actors to shape a more radical and extremist variant of Islam leading to theological dissent and sectarian wedge by replacing pluralist traditions. In this process of re-identification, Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (the finality of Prophethood) emerged as a rallying point where various religious groups like Deobandi, Barelwi and Majlis-i-Ahrar converged and tried to stay at the level of an intellectual and moral struggle against minority religious groups, the Ahmadiyya and Shias with a unified and extreme exclusionary disposition. This paper makes a historical analysis of how religious ideologues in the post-colonial state of Pakistan, articulated their religious authority to gain their political objective of participation in the national narrative constructed on the idea of a consensual singular Islamic identity. How they manifested their distinct religious positions into the political positions and turned to violence by kicking off 1953 and 1974 Khatm-e-Nabuwat movements. It analyses the state's role as twopronged, the policy of accommodation of minority groups in 1953 movement, however in 1974 movement, religious ideologues enhanced their political role, manipulated by pressing upon government for legislative and religious exclusion of Ahmadiyya through legal and administrative measures, hence legitimized the violence against the minority groups. The paper will also highlight how Barelwi ideologues, who drew their strength from the charismatic

Oge Samuel Okonkwo

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The Changing Phases of Igbo Agitation for Sovereignty in Postcolonial Nigeria: 1960-2015

Igbo people did not anticipate that Nigeria's return to a democratic republic in 1999 would have such a profound influence on them. It did not strengthen their ties to Nigeria, but it did result in the formation of separatist organizations - The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), a political organization, founded in south-eastern Nigeria in November 1999, which rose to prominence in Igboland within two years. This was followed by the rise of another separatist group, the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB). Why was there such enthusiasm for separatism and violence, despite the fact that the first Biafra Republic (1967–1970) was associated with gruesome memories? Many scholars have dealt with the war and post-civil war era, but the issue of Igbo agitation for sovereignty has not received adequate historical research. Using oral and archival sources as evidence, my work seeks to fill this gap by exploring the background changes, dynamics and trajectory of the Igbo Agitation for Sovereignty in post- colonial Nigeria from 1960 to 2015. This research argues that the Igbo struggle for statehood evolved in the post-Biafra war era due to socio- political, economic grievances and a strong sense of collective victimisation against the Igbos. Consequently, this renewed agitation led to the birth of radical and sometimes violent groups who began to clamour for Igbo secession upon Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999. This Igbo agitation has existed in Nigeria for a long period of time, which is significant because it may help us comprehend other ethnic violent agitations in the West African country, for example, in the Niger Delta and the Middle Belt, and the terror group Boko Haram. Moreover, the Biafra narrative brings together many topics into one event, including the effects of colonialism, the challenges of nation-building, and the politics of ethnic plurality. These matters also illuminate a great deal of what historians find fascinating about the past and why they think it is crucial for individuals to grasp in order to make sense of the world.

Carwil Bjork-James

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Turns Toward and Away from Violent Repression in Democratic Bolivia

Military rule prevailed in Bolivia from 1964 to 1982 (with brief interludes) and massacres, "disappearances," and other extrajudicial executions were commonplace during the years of dictatorship. The country's post-1982 democratic period has been marked by continued political dynamism, but far less political violence. Where 50–500 people died annually in political conflict during military rule, deaths dropped to an average of less than 8/year from 1983 to 1997. Deaths peaked at over 130 in 2003 under President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, before dropping to approximately 10/year under Evo Morales. Finally, a renewed spike in violence claimed 38 lives in the 2019 political crisis. In general, state security forces rather than armed non-state actors have been the principal perpetrators of deadly violence, while the dead have been largely unarmed participants in protest.

An effective account of this history needs to explain both the intense, concentrated use of violence (and its divergent effects on protest) and the political forces that restrained deadly violence during major parts of the democratic period. In this paper, I focus specifically on two phenomena that form the background and foreground of a long-term picture of state repression during Bolivia's current democratic period. First, a wide variety of political figures have publicly disavowed the use of deadly force to stop protest. This includes heads of state who pledged (sometimes successfully) to avoid deadly repression on their watch, legislators and civil society leaders who repudiated violent turns by the government, and protesters who defined any and all violent repression as an echo of F1 12 Tfvend aly in

Sikiru Abiona Yusuff

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Exiting Violence (Q-801)

Hugh McDonnell

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The Authority of Violence and Non-Violence: General Jacques Pâris de Bollardière

In April 1957, general Jacques Pâris de Bollardière abruptly quit the French army. He had only been promoted a few months before, and was the youngest officer of that rank to serve in France's escalating counter-insurgency campaign against the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). However, Bollardière refused to accept the use of torture in the "pacification" of France's North African departments. In doing so, he jettisoned a celebrated career forged during the Second World War at Narvik, in Abyssinia, Syria, the deserts of North Africa, the Resistance maquis in the Ardennes, in the final Allied advance on Germany in 1945, and in France's colonial war in Indochina (1945-1954).

Bollardière would subsequently reinterpret his commitment to military service that had characterized his conservative family upbringing in Brittany. Instead of continuing the proud military tradition of generations of the Bollardières, he gradually came to the conclusion that, counterintuitively, remaining faithful to his formative values meant throwing himself into the non-violence movement. He was a founding member of the Mouvement pour une Alternative Non-Violente (MAN), in the deliberate (and indeed, problematic) acronym. In his commitment to non-violence, he engaged former military colleagues in now forgotten, high-profile national debates about the violence and legacy of France's wars. He championed conscientious objectors, campaigned against nuclear weaponry, critiqued the French military establishment, and advocated alternative non-violent forms of defense and local democracy based on self-management.

This paper analyses Bollardière's references to his experience of war in the French army as a highly decorated soldier precisely as the basis of his authority to advocate for nonviolence. Conversely, it examines how opponents of Bollardière countered his claims to authority on this basis. The paper's analysis of the dynamics of these contestations of the authority to speak about violence and non-violence focuses on three key episodes: first, the curiously forgotten high-profile media debates incurred by general Jacques Massu's 1971 publication of La vraie bataille d'Alger, Bollardière's 1972 response in Bataille d'Alger, bataille de l'homme, and the flurry of articles that ensued in the French media by both men and their defenders and detractors. Second, Bollardière's expedition to Mururoa in 1973 to put himself in the way of French nuclear bomb tests, again causing significant media fallout. And third, Bollardière's participation in the Larzac movement, which campaigned throughout the 1970s against the extension of a French army base in the area.

Timothy William Waters

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Not Enough Death: The Perverse Incentives of Remedial Secession

Theories about the proper response to oppression and persecution – up to and including a right of revolution – have traditionally focused on the improvement or replacement of the government rather than exit from the polity – curiously, since one of the early cases in modern theory was the American Revolution. That revolt was also an early example of the one major contemporary legal doctrine allowing exit – what is now called 'remedial secession.'

Remedial secession – the right of a group to form its own state in response to great harms emanating from the existing state -- is a controversial doctrine, but also often the only meaningful tool available to communities facing persecution and genocide.

But remedial secession is a reactive doctrine, only deployed after violence and harm have reached intolerable levels. Indeed, the doctrine creates perverse, truly terrifying incentives for oppressed communities to *maximize* their suffering in order to strengthen their claim for exit.

Focused is it on thresholds of violence, remedial secession fails to address the political logic of the crises in which the doctrine is deployed. The kind of communities that invoke remedial secession are, in fact, what traditionally would have been recognized as self-determining communities that might have claimed statehood not as a remedy for suffering, but as a right.

If we accept the moral case for remedial secession, we should follow its logic and recognize that the crises in which we invoke the doctrine are self-determination disputes even before the violence metastasizes. Law should treat them as such: We need a doctrine not only to alleviate suffering, but to vindicate human political desire.

This paper proposes such a model: It outlines the current doctrine of remedial secession, the perverse incentives it creates to increase rather than mitigate state violence, and an alternative that recenters claims for protection around political identity rather than narratives of suffering.

Yesim Yaprak Yildiz

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Exploring Complicity and Complacency in State-led Atrocities in Turkey

There is not a single decade in Turkish history without massacres or grave violations against ethnic and religious minorities or the political opposition. While these acts of violence were often carried out under direct state control, various segments of the population actively or passively participated, further complicating the layers of denial, guilt, and responsibility. This long-standing history of political violence against different segments of society has also been a history of disciplining the population over what to see, what to hear, and what to say. The cultivation of docile citizenship in Turkey has been achieved through various mechanisms, including education, media, judicial harassment, and physical threats. Consequently, the result has been a largely silent society in the face of political scandals and atrocious crimes against civilians. Although fear plays a significant role in this silence, I argue that complicity and complacency have become the defining features of the moral order in Turkey. Navaro-Yashin previously defined cynicism as a primary characteristic of the Turkish public in the 1990s when the state's links with organized crime became undeniable. In this paper, I aim to demonstrate that complicity and complacency now largely define the moral order in Turkey in response to state-led violence against individuals and communities. To support my argument, I will analyze public and media reactions to the killing and burning of a Kurdish family in the central Anatolian city of Konya in 2021, allegedly over a nonpolitical dispute as well as to the Turkish state's cross-border operation into the Kurdish Syrian city of Afrin in 2018. By exploring the emergence of complicit and complacent subjectivities within public debates surrounding these cases, I aim to